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The aim of this paper is to examine Wittgenstein’s 
arguments against the meaningfulness of statements 
which state the possessive privacy of sensations; and to 
demonstrate their incorrectness. 
The English word ‘same’ is ambiguous and 
according to that the following proposition is ambiguous 
too:  
(1)  The car of Peter is the same car as the car 
of Paul. 
The ambiguity of the word ‘same’ is caused by the 
fact that the word ‘same’ can be used in English in two 
different ways and meanings. Let us therefore distinguish 
‘same1’ and ‘same2’. What do ‘same1’ and ‘same2’ mean? 
To make the differences between ‘same1’ and ‘same2’ 
precise and obvious we can give the following definitions 
of ‘φ is the same1 F as α’ and ‘φ is the same2 F as α’: 
[S1]  For all objects x and y: x is the same1 F as 
y ↔ x ∈ {F} and y ∈ {F} and x = y. 
[S2]  For all objects x and y: x is the same2 F as 
y ↔ x ∈ {G} and y ∈ {G} and {G} ⊂ {F}.   
Commonly the sameness of kind [S1] is called 
token-identity or numerical identity and the sameness of 
kind [S2] is called type-identity or qualitative identity. 
In the paragraphs PU §244 – 254 of the 
Philosophical Investigations1[I] Ludwig Wittgenstein 
focuses - in connection with the discussion of privacy (of a 
language and the consciousness) (PU §243 – 315) - on 
the following proposition: 
(2)  (All) Sensations are (necessarily) private. 
This proposition is in more than two ways 
ambiguous, because of the ambiguity of the word ‘private’ 
(PI §246). Therefore Wittgenstein distinguishes two kinds 
of privacy: (a) the epistemic privacy of sensations and (b) 
the possessive privacy of sensations.  
If we interpret ‘private’ for example in (2) as 
‘possessively private’ then we can again distinguish to 
kinds of possessive privacy. And these two readings are 
especially connected with the ambiguity of (1) and ‘same’. 
We can interpret:  
(2*)  (All) Sensations are (necessarily) 
possessively private. 
as (2*.1) A person x and a person y can’t 
have the same1 sensations. 
and (2*.2) A person x and a person y can’t 
have the same2 sensations. 
It is obvious - as Wittgenstein states in PI §253 - 
that (2*.2) is a false proposition; but what about (2*.1)? If 
we interpret the expression ‘can’ in (2*.1) as logical 
necessity then (2*.1) seems to be a metaphysical truth: the 
consequence of a certain ontological interpretation of the 
world, which is normally called substance-ontology. We 
can reformulate (2*.1) as follows to clarify the claim that 
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the expression ‘can’ in (2*.1) is understood as logical 
necessity: 
(2*.1.1)  It is necessary that for all x and y: 
if x≠ y and x has a sensation and y has a sensation then 
the sensation of x≠ the sensation of y. 
According to a specific reading of substance-
ontology - which is for example supported by Frege2 [II] - 
sensations have the following characteristics:  
(O1)  Sensations are owned: they are part of the 
consciousness of a certain person.  
(O2)  Sensations need a bearer; this bearer (= a 
mental substance) is a certain person. 
(O3)  Every sensation has one and only one 
bearer (=a certain person that owns the sensations or is 
the bearer of them). 
(2*.1.1) can be derived from the axioms (O1) – 
(O3) of this specific reading of substance - ontology as a 
necessary truth. This fact that (2*.1.1) is a consequence of 
(O1) – (O3) can easily be shown. A proper formulation of 
(O3) is: 
(3) It is necessary that for all x and y: x has a 
sensation iff x has the sensation of x and no y has the 
sensation of x iff x≠y. 
The logical form of (3) is: ∀x∀y ((Sx ↔ (Hxs(x) ∧ 
¬Hys(x)) ↔¬(x=y))   
Now we can derive (2*.1.1), which has the logical 
form ‘∀x∀y (¬(x=y ∧ Sx ∧ Sy) → ¬(s(x)=s(y)))’, from (3) 
and the following reformulation of (O1): 
(4) It is necessary that for all x, y, u and v: if x≠y 
and x is a bearer of u and y is a bearer of v then u≠v. 
And now if we apply (4) to (3) we get:  
(5) It is necessary that for all x and y: if x has a 
sensation iff x has the sensation of x and no y that has the 
sensation of x iff x≠y then the sensation of x≠ the 
sensation of y . 
The logical form of (5) is ‘∀x∀y((Sx ↔ (Hxs(x) ∧ 
¬Hys(x)) ↔¬(x=y)) → ¬(s(x)=s(y)))’ and therefore we can 
derive from (3) and (5) the conclusion (2*.1.1). And that 
means that (2*.1.1) is a logical consequence of the above-
sketched version of substance-ontology and therefore a 
necessary truth. 
According to Wittgenstein the view that (2*.1.1) is 
a metaphysical truth is incorrect. He holds the thesis that 
[CW] (2) - interpreted as (2*.1.1) - is nonsensical.   
In my opinion Wittgenstein gives in his works two 
different arguments to justify this claim. I will focus in this 
paper on the first one of Wittgenstein’s arguments to justify 
[CW]. And it is my aim to show that this argument has two 
major weaknesses.  
In the Philosophical Remarks3 [III] and the Blue 
Book4 [IV] Wittgenstein puts forward the following 
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argument [A1] to justify [CW]: According to Wittgenstein 
(all) propositions that are necessary truths do not express 
a metaphysical or ontological necessity: for example that 
something is true in every possible world. Necessary truths 
are no metaphysical truths! In Wittgenstein’s opinion a 
necessary truth expresses a convention (of our language) 
or an (implicit) rule of grammar5. Therefore we can define 
logical necessity according to Wittgenstein as follows:   
[LN] ‘ p’ is a necessarily true   iff  ‘p’ is or 
expresses a rule of grammar or a convention of a 
language6 [3] 
On this background we can reformulate (2*.1.1) as 
follows: 
(6) ‘For all x, y: if x≠ y and x has a sensation and y 
has a sensation then the sensation of x≠ the sensation of 
y’ is or expresses a rule of grammar. 
On the first sight according to this analysis (2*.1.1) 
seems to be true as (6) is. How can it then be 
nonsensical? We have to revise our assumptions to 
understand Wittgenstein’ claim. We have to reformulate 
(2*.1.1) as follows:  
(7) For all x, y: if x≠ y and x has a sensation and y 
has a sensation then the sensation of x≠ the sensation of 
y. 
What are nonsensical proposition according to 
Wittgenstein? Let us examine three possible answers to 
this question. We can (A) for example define ‘φ is 
nonsensical’ as ‘φ is neither true nor false’. 
[N1]  ‘p’ is nonsensical  iff  ‘p’ is neither true nor 
false.  
According to [LN] and (6) the proposition (7) is a 
rule of grammar and rules of grammar are neither true nor 
false. Therefore (77) is in the sense of [N1] nonsensical. 
The problem with (A) is that we do not use the predicate ‘φ 
is nonsensical’ interchangeable with ‘φ is neither true nor 
false’ in English and [N1] is not combinable with [LN]: How 
can a proposition that is neither true nor false be 
necessarily true? A more serious problem of [N1] is that 
Wittgenstein never explicitly holds [N1].  
A further alternative (B) is: We can interpret ‘φ is 
nonsensical’ as a predicate of assertions of propositions 
(statements) and not of propositions itself: 
[N2] the assertion of ‘p’ is nonsensical  iff  ‘p’ is a 
rule of grammar. 
And this fact can be justified. Rules of grammar 
are no empirical proposition, but normative propositions 
which are in fact neither true nor false. If someone asserts 
a proposition, he asserts thereby the truth of the 
proposition. But it is nonsensical or incorrect to assert the 
truth of proposition that is a rule of grammar and therefore 
neither true nor false; that means if a proposition is a rule 
of grammar then the assertion of this proposition is 
nonsense. The problem with this definition is that it is too 
narrow, because we also call assertions of some 
propositions, which aren’t rules of grammar, nonsensical or 
incorrect. And [N2] is as [N1] not compatible with [LN]: 
How can a proposition that is neither true nor false be 
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necessarily true? Is the assertion of a necessary true 
proposition nonsensical? 
A third and last alternative (C) to justify [CW] is: 
We follow our intuitions that nonsensical propositions 
offend against something; for example against rules of 
syntax, grammar etc. So we define ‘φ is nonsensical’ as 
follows: 
[N3] ‘p’ is nonsensical  iff  ‘p’ offends against a rule 
of grammar. 
We said that (7) is or expresses a rule of grammar. 
Wittgenstein calls such propositions grammatical 
propositions. The negation of (7) is: 
(8) There is at least one x and y: (x≠y and x has a 
sensation and y has a sensation) and (the sensation of x= 
the sensation of y). 
And (8) seems to offend against the rule of 
grammar expressed by (7) as every propositions that can 
be derived from (8) like: 
(9) a≠b and a has sensation and b has sensation 
and the sensation of a = the sensation of b. 
An ordinary language reading of (9) can be 
formulated as: 
(11*) A person a (that is different from a person b) 
has the same1 sensation as a person b.  
Therefore (8) and (9) / (9*) are nonsensical 
propositions according to [N3]7. And if we combine [N3] 
with the famous Wittgensteinian principle: 
[WP] If ‘p’ is nonsensical then the negation of ‘p’ is 
nonsensical too, 
then according to [N3] and [WP] (7) is as well as 
(8) nonsensical.  
But we are again confronted with two major 
problems with our Wittgensteinian analysis on the 
background of  [N3]: Is it possible to formulate a rule of 
grammar for a term t or a proposition p just by using t or p 
and without mentioning t or p? Propositions like (2) or (7) 
seem to be propositions about pains and persons and not 
about language use. They seem to express no rule of 
grammar. We have already quoted a passage of the Blue 
Book where Wittgenstein says that by means of ‘My pain is 
my pain and his pain is his pain’ someone makes a 
grammatical statement about the use of such a phrase as 
‘the same1 pain’; we say that we don't wish to apply the 
phrase, ‘he has got my pain’ or ‘we both have the same 
pain’. Is this claim of Wittgenstein correct? The following 
proposition for example expresses a rule of grammar: (10) 
It is not correct to apply the relation ‘φ is the same1 F as α’ 
to sensations in English. In (10) the term‘φ is the same1 F 
as α’, which should be ruled, is mentioned. A grammatical 
proposition that expresses a rule of grammar should be 
about words or propositions, about the possible uses of a 
specific term or proposition and it is only possible to say 
something about the use of a specific term or proposition 
by means of mentioning the term or proposition: The 
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as a reason you will be inclined to say: "because my pain is my pain and his 
pain is his pain". And here you are making a grammatical statement about the 
use of such a phrase as "the same pain". You say that you don't wish to apply 
the phrase, "he has got my pain" or "we both have the same pain", and 
instead, perhaps, you will apply such a phrase as "his pain is exactly like 
mine". (It would be no argument to say that the two couldn't have the same 
pain because one might anaesthetize or kill one of them while the other still 
felt pain.) Of course, if we exclude the phrase "I have his toothache" from our 
language, we thereby also exclude "I have (or feel) my toothache".” (BB p.54 –
55) 
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proposition (11) ‘My pain is my pain and his pain is his 
pain’ is not about terms and their use and therefore it is not 
possible to express a rule of grammar by means of such 
propositions as (11). Therefore the claim of Wittgenstein is 
not correct that (2) is a grammatical proposition or that it 
expresses a rule of grammar in the specific reading of 
(2*.1.1), because in (2) and (2*.1.1) all terms are used and 
no term is mentioned and they are in fact propositions 
about pains and persons. 
A second problem of Wittgenstein’s analysis is the 
following: Is it really true that it is no matter of fact that the 
relation ‘φ is the same1 F α’ can’t be applied to sensations 
and just a matter of the rules of grammar? I don’t think so. 
What would happen if it would be correct to apply the 
relation ‘φ is the same1α’ to sensations in our language? It 
would probably cause us to think more intensive about the 
strange thing called ‘identity’. And maybe then we would 
come to the same conclusion as Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus (5.5303): “To say that two things are identical is 
nonsense…" But this is in fact no serious strategy. The 
fact that two persons cannot feel the same1 pain is not a 
matter of convention, because we cannot imagine the case 
that they do. If it would be a convention it must be possible 
to change the convention, but this case seems to be 
impossible and beyond our rational capacity.  
It seems to me that Wittgenstein has no plausible 
arguments against the claim that two persons cannot 
share the same1 feelings, which is not only a dogma of 
substance-ontology, but also a common-sense truth. 
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